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Zeiss v. Zeiss-
The Cold War in a Microcosmt
I. Historical Background
On June 7, 1971 the Supreme Court of the United States denied a
petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, in Carl Zeiss v. VEB Carl Zeiss Jena, thus ringing
down the curtain on a 9-1/2 year East-West battle for control of the world-
famous "Zeiss" name and trademarks in the United States.
The American litigation was only one of some 20-odd battles which had
been fought between the West and East German parties in courts and
patent offices across the world from New York to Tokyo in a trademark
war that had its genesis in the post-war division of Germany.
The opening gun in the worldwide litigation was fired in 1954 in the
West German courts after nine years of ambivalent collaboration. Then
last summer a truce was called following defeat of the East German Zeiss
firm in the United States. At that time, a worldwide settlement was reached
terminating over 17 years of costly and protracted litigation.
Almost 100 years separated the date of April 13, 1945, when the first
American soldiers entered Jena and set in motion the events which were
the immediate cause of the East-West litigation, and the year 1846 when a
highly skilled mechanic named Carl Zeiss established his optical workshop
in the same city, which was then located in the Grand Duchy of
Saxe-Weimar Eisenach.
For the next thirty years, Zeiss' workshop grew, until in 1875 Zeiss
joined forces with a physicist at the University of Jena, Professor Ernst
Abbe, who was vitally interested in the development of optical science.
Four years later, in 1879, Roderick Zeiss, the son of the founder, became
the third partner in the Zeiss firm.
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Beginning about 1884, Zeiss and Abbe, joined by the optical physicist
Otto Schott, began to manufacture optical and other types of glass through
a firm known as Jenaer Glaswerk Schott & Gen.
When Carl Zeiss died in 1888, Professor Abbe decided to take the
necessary steps to give the Zeiss and Schott firms more permanent form.
As one with a strong sense of civic responsibility and interest in social
progress, Professor Abbe chose a form of legal entity which then, as now,
was unusual for a commercial enterprise. This was the "Stiftung" or
foundation. An institution such as the Zeiss Foundation was established
under the then prevailing law, by means of a written declaration somewhat
akin to a deed of trust (either in the form of an inter vivos instrument or a
will), which then had to be approved by the appropriate governmental
authority, in this case, the Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar Eisenach.
The Foundation was originally formed in 1889 and in 1891 it acquired
all of the assets of the Zeiss partnership, and a one-half interest in the
Schott firm (the remaining one-half interest was eventually acquired from
Otto Schott in 1919).
The principal governing instrument of the Foundation was the "Statut"
or charter, first drafted by Professor Abbe in 1889 and redrafted and
resubmitted in 1896, which Statut (with certain modifications which will be
discussed later) remains as the governing charter of the Zeiss Foundation
to this day.
As the District Court found,' what Abbe established "was a contin-
uation of the two basic existing commercial enterprises, the Zeiss and
Schott works, as the property of the Foundation, to be operated privately
as a permanent cooperative business venture or association with a view to
its realizing a profit from such operation."
Rather than distributing the profits to the owners as would have been the
case with a more conventional form of commercial organization, the profits
realized by the Foundation were to be used primarily to maintain, develop
and increase the Zeiss and Schott enterprises and to provide economic and
social benefits for the workers employed in them. Any surplus remaining
was to be used for the general promotion of technical knowledge and
science and for financial support of community organizations in and around
Jena where the Zeiss and Schott works were then located.
Professor Abbe made it clear that he had no intention of establishing a
charitable foundation, but rather a cooperative commercial venture, which
would benefit all those persons who were making a contribution to it either
as employees or as persons working in natural and mathematical sciences
or in public organizations in and around Jena.
1160 USPQ 100.
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The Foundation Statut established a rather elaborate organization for
management of the two commercial enterprises. It stipulated that the Zeiss
and Schott firms were to carry on their respective business activities under
their own individual firm names with their separate assets and that each
was to be managed by a separate "Board of Management" consisting of
three or four members appointed either for life or for a fixed period of time.
Overall responsibility for seeing to it that the terms of the Statut would
be carried out, as well as for administration of the non-industrial activity of
the Foundation, was assigned to a so-called "Special Board" which also
had the power to appoint the members of the Boards of Management of the
Zeiss and Schott firms.
In his Statut, Professor Abbe entrusted the functions of the Special
Board to the agency of the local government, which was responsible for the
general supervision over the affairs of the University of Jena. At the same
time, Professor Abbe made it clear that the Zeiss and Schott enterprises
would not become state enterprises.
The Zeiss Foundation Statut also provided for the appointment by the
Special Board, of a Foundation Deputy ("Stiftungskomissar"), whose job it
was to represent the Special Board vis-h-vis the Boards of Management of
the two individual commercial enterprises. The Deputy was without power
to intervene directly in the management of the commercial enterprises,
although he had to be consulted and his consent obtained with respect to
certain specific matters, as well as matters as to which the members of a
Board of Management did not reach unanimous agreement.
Professor Abbe foresaw the possibility of political changes in the Grand
Duchy (although the changes he anticipated were not the radical changes in
political and economic structure which followed World War II). Thus, he
provided that in the event of "political changes in the State," the functions
of the Special Board were to be carried out by "that department of State
which, with regard to the University of Jena, occupies the place of the
State department of the Grand Duchy acting as the Special Board, pro-
vided that its seat is in Thuringia, otherwise by the highest administrative
authorities in Thuringia."
He further provided that in the event that there was no administrative
body corresponding to this definition, the functions of the Special Board
were to be assumed by the Board of Management of the Zeiss firm, until
such time as they could be transferred to a new Special Board.
One thing Professor Abbe did not expressly foresee was that circum-
stances might occur, which would prevent the Foundation and its enter-
prises from continuing to function in and around Jena. In fact, in the
Foundation Statut, it was not only provided that the domicile of the
Foundation was to be in Jena, but also that this provision could "under no
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circumstances and in no manner be legally amended or rendered inopera-
tive." 2
Following the establishment of the Foundation, the Zeiss and Schott
enterprises continued to prosper. In addition, the Foundation acquired a
number of corporate manufacuring affiliates in various parts of Germany,
including, in 1926, the firm of Zeiss Ikon AG of Dresden, a manufacturer
of photographic equipment.
As time went on, the Zeiss firm developed a worldwide reputation in the
optical-precision mechanical field and its name, and trademarks became
synonomous with the highest quality in precision optics.
The oldest of the trademarks consisted of the word "Zeiss" which was
first used by the Zeiss firm in 1846, and was first registered in the United
States in 1912. Although not as old, the trademark consisting of the words
"Carl Zeiss Jena" in a distinctive lens frame became more famous as time
went on. It was adopted by the Zeiss firm in 1903 and was first used in the
United States in 1907.
Between the time of its creation and 1945, the Foundation survived a
number of political changes in Germany. Thus in 1920, the Grand Duchy
of Saxe-Weimar Eisenach, in which the Foundation was first created, was
dissolved and merged with a number of other German duchies and princi-
palities to become the newly established Land of Thuringia, a state of the
German Federal Republic (also known as the Weimar Republic).
Thereafter, the functions of the Special Board previously exercised by
the Ministry of State of the Grand Duchy, were exercised by the Ministry
of Education of the Land of Thuringia. From 1933 to 1945 the functions of
the Special Board were exercised by the Reich's Governor of Thuringia.
The Nazi period was a difficult one for the Foundation. From 1933 to
1935 the Boards of Management of the Zeiss and Schott enterprises
resisted efforts of the Nazi Government to install a representative of the
Nazi regime within the Foundation. In 1935 a compromise was reached
pursuant to which, in exchange for remaining independent of direct in-
volvement by the Nazi regime in the Foundation's affairs, the members of
the Boards of Management of Zeiss and Schott became nominal members
of the Nazi Party.
Shortly after the American Armed Forces occupied Jena in 1945, it was
determined that the Land of Thuringia was to become part of the Soviet
Zone. Therefore, in mid-June 1945 the American military authorities put
into effect a plan to remove the top management scientists and adminis-
2Certain other provisions of the Statut relating to the purpose of the Foundation, its
name, its governing bodies and the manner of amendment were also stipulated to be unamen-
dable.
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trative personnel of the Zeiss and Schott firms with their families to the
American zone of occupation.
This move was part of an established American policy to bring leading
German scientists under American control, where they could be used in
connection with the continuing war effort against Japan. In this instance,
the Americans planned to establish a Zeiss factory in the American Zone.
The members of the Boards of Management of Zeiss and Schott were
understandably reluctant to leave Jena and their colleagues, but they had
no choice.
While they did not foresee a division of Germany, they did see the
possibility that they might be absent from Jena for a long period of time,
during which the enterprises would have to be managed. They therefore
appointed certain persons to carry out their management functions while
they were away. The East German defendants contended that the Board
members, before leaving Jena in June 1945, tendered oral resignations, but
the District Court concluded, after reviewing the evidence and appraising
the witnesses, that there was no such resignation.
The evacuation took place on June 24 and 25, 1945. On June 27, the
caretakers in Jena appointed to act in the Board's absence, took steps to
provide a legal underpinning for their authority to manage the Zeiss and
Schott works in the absence of the lifetime managers.
The situation in Jena at this time, and throughout Germany in general,
was one of understandable confusion, particularly the legal situation. While
it is clear that Germany continued to exist after the collapse of the Nazi
r6gime as a unified state in the international sense, with central govern-
mental authority in the hands of the Allied Control Council, the local
governmental situation in Thuringia was more uncertain.
Defendants offered some evidence (in the nature of hearsay) which
indicated that on June 9, 1945, a representative of the VIII United States
Army Corps, during its brief stay in the Weimar area, purported to appoint
a prime minister and other officials of a new government for the Land of
Thuringia. However, four days earlier the Allies had consummated an
agreement designating Thuringia as part of the Soviet Zone and the Allied
agreements had provided that each of the military commanders would
exercise jurisdiction within his country's own zone of occupation.
It was not until July 16, 1945 that the Soviet military administration
announced the formation of a new government for the Land of Thuringia.
Thus, as the District Court found, following the departure of the Boards of
Management of the Zeiss and Schott works "an ad hoc temporary govern-
mental authority... joined forces with equally temporary ad hoc care-
takers... and in anticipation of the impending Soviet occupation at-
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tempted to give themselves some sort of legal standing that might be
acceptable to the Russians, despite the fact that the official Board members
never resigned." 3
Some time after the deportation, when it became apparent that the
enforced absence of the Zeiss and Schott Boards of Management from
Jena might be of longer duration than expected, a dispute as to manage-
ment authority arose between the Board of Management in the West and
the caretakers in Jena (who were then under the control of the Soviet
occupying forces).
In order to resolve the dispute, and to avoid the appearance of control of
the firms' businesses in Jena by the deported managements in the West,
which it was feared would precipitate unwelcome steps by the Soviet
occupiers, an arrangement was made whereby the deported managements
would refrain from exercising their functions, with respect to the manage-
ment of the businesses in Jena for as long as they were forced to be absent
from Jena, and would temporarily acknowledge that the Jena caretakers
were the sole responsible management in Jena.
This temporary arrangement continued until June 1948 when, as had
been feared, all of the commercial properties of the Foundation located in
the Soviet Zone, including all assets of the Zeiss and Schott firms (together
with the trademarks used in their businesses) were expropriated without
compensation and transferred to state ownership.
Following expropriation, the Zeiss and Schott works formed part of an
association of so-called People's Owned Enterprises. In May 1951, the two
enterprises were separated from the association, and became independent
legal entities directly subordinated to the Ministry of Machine Construc-
tion. The State corporation which took over the Zeiss works became
known as "VEB Carl Zeiss Jena." ("VEB" stands for "Volkseigener
Betrieb" or State-owned enterprise.)
Meanwhile, the group of managers and scientists removed by the Ameri-
can military authorities, were encouraged to build up a new Zeiss works in
Wuerttemberg, and in the summer of 1946 a group consisting of approxi-
mately 200 persons commenced limited production in the town of Oberko-
chen.
Later that year they formed a new company under the name of Opton
GmbH, later Zeiss Opton. 95% of Opton's capital stock was issued
directly to the Carl Zeiss Foundation and 5% to two named individuals to
be held in trust for the Foundation. Up until the time of the expropriation
of the Zeiss and Schott firms in the Soviet Zone, the East and West groups
cooperated.
3 160 USPQ 107.
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Upon learning of the facts surrounding the expropriations, the Western
Zeiss group considered the question of how best to preserve the identity
and assets of the Carl Zeiss Foundation, which they believed could no
longer function in the Soviet Zone of Occupation.
With the disappearance of the Foundation in the Soviet Zone, and the
transformation of the Jena caretaker managements into state functionaries
operating the expropriated works for the benefit, and under the direction
of, the state (not the Foundation), Heidenheim, where the Board of Man-
agement and leading Zeiss scientists were acting, became de facto the
principal place of business of the Zeiss firm and the administrative center
of the Foundation, as its owner and operator.
After puzzling over the legal questions raised by the unprecendented
situation in which the Foundation found itself, and conferring with the local
authorities in Wuerttemberg, it was decided to make use of the provision in
the Foundation's Statut pursuant to which the Zeiss Board of Management
assumed the functions of the Special Board pending the latter's reconstitu-
tion.
Because the Foundation Statut provided that the domicile of the Foun-
dation should always be in Jena, and there was therefore great uncertainty
as to whether this could validly be changed, it was decided to give the
Foundation a second domicile in Heidenheim, Wuerttemberg. This was
done by means of a ministerial decree issued by the Government of
Wuerttemberg in February 1949. While there was no legal precedent for a
land other than that of the Foundation's domicile, in effect, to alter its
governing instrument or charter, the situation itself was unprecedented.
The issuance of the Ministerial Decree in 1949 permitted the Zeiss
managers in the West, to assume legal control of the Foundation's assets
outside the Soviet Zone.
Between 1948 and 1953, the Zeiss firm in Heidenheim cooperated
commercially with the socialized enterprise in Jena, and for a time per-
mitted the latter to sell Zeiss-marked products under certain specified
conditions. The cooperation deteriorated as the East German r6gime tight-
ened its grasp on the expropriated works (after a workers' uprising in Jena
in June 1953), and was terminated at the end of 1953 as legal battles
loomed.
In preparation for the impending legal struggle, the East German r6gime
which had been established by the Soviet occupying forces in October
1949 as the "German Democratic Republic," while refusing to revive the
Foundation by returning its expropriated enterprises, sought instead to
"warm up" the defunct Foundation, and give it the appearance of activity
by making appointments of non-existent Boards of Management and other
positions long vacant. This sham entity, which the District Court termed
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"a pseudo-type organization," was a facade for claiming identity with the
original Foundation and ownership of exclusive rights to all the Zeiss
marks outside East Germany.
In February 1954, the Zeiss firm in Heidenheim, in the first of a series of
lawsuits (which have since proliferated into a world-wide confrontation)
obtained an injunction in the District Court of Goettingen (West Germany)
against the continued sale of Jena-made Zeiss-marked goods by a West
German distributor of VEB Carl Zeiss Jena.
Shortly thereafter, in April 1954, the sham East German "Foundation"
filed suit in West Germany against the Zeiss firm, seeking an injunction and
an order registering the Zeiss marks in West Germany in its name. That
action was ultimately dismissed in 1960 when the West German Supreme
Court ruled that there was no one in the Soviet Zone having capacity to
represent the Zeiss Foundation.
At about the same time, the Zeiss firm brought an action in West
Germany to obtain an order, enjoining the East German Zeiss firm from
using the Zeiss name and marks anywhere in the world. The action re-
sulted in a judgment in favor of the Heidenheim firm, affirmed by the
Supreme Court of the German Federal Republic, which determined that
the Heidenheim firm was entitled to exclusive use of the Zeiss name and
marks in West Germany and West Berlin.
Since February 1954, there has also been litigation with respect to the
Zeiss marks in various other countries throughout the world. In December
1958, the Jena "Foundation" brought suit in East Germany against the
Zeiss firm. The action resulted in a default judgment against the Zeiss firm,
which was affirmed with modifications by the East 'German Supreme Court
in March 1961.
In the United States, the situation was complicated by the fact that as
early as 1919, the United States Government had purported to vest the
Zeiss trademarks in the Alien Property Custodian. However, despite this
vesting, the Zeiss firm continued to use these trademarks exclusively in the
United States until at least 1941. Prior to 1925, the Zeiss firm sold its
goods in the United States through various independent distributors.
In 1925, a wholly owned subsidiary, Carl Zeiss, Inc., was organized in
New York. Thereafter, until the entry of the United States into World War
II at the end of 1941, Zeiss goods were sold in the United States primarily
through Carl Zeiss, Inc. In August 1942 all of the capital stock of Carl
Zeiss, Inc. was vested by the United States Government in the Alien
Property Custodian, and the stock remained so vested until the end of
1960.
The sale of Zeiss Ikon products was resumed in the United States in
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1947. In 1949 the Zeiss plant in Jena, now controlled by the East German
State-owned enterprise VEB Carl Zeiss Jena, began to sell Zeiss trade-
marked goods in the United States through Carl Zeiss, Inc., then still
owned by the Attorney General. It changed distributors in 1950, switching
to a New York firm, Ercona Corporation.
After 1949, Zeiss products originating both in West and East Germany,
continued to be imported into the United States, and the District Court
found that confusion among members of the consuming public resulted.
Between 1954 and February 1962, when the American law suit was
commenced by the West German Zeiss group, litigations were pending in
various countries of Western Europe and Egypt. By 1962, the West Ger-
man Zeiss group felt that it had sufficient resources and interests at stake to
embark on what it knew would be a protracted litigation in the United
States courts.
II. The American Litigation
The complaint in the American litigation was filed on February 14,
1962. Plaintiffs were the Carl Zeiss Foundation and Zeiss kon AG.
Named as Defendants were VEB Carl Zeiss Jena and two of its American
distributors, Steelmasters, Inc. and Ercona Corporation, as well as two
other American firms which had been distributing East German cameras in
the United States containing East German Zeiss lenses. 4
The first problem was to get jurisdiction over the East German
State-owned enterprise calling itself "VEB Carl Zeiss Jena." This was
accomplished by service of process on the East German firm's exclusive
distributor in the United States-Ercona Corporation. The East Germans
did not accept the jurisdiction of our courts without a struggle, however,
but made a motion to dismiss, which was denied by Judge Weinfeld in
April 1963.
The defendants counterclaimed, and thus the pleadings presented rival
claims to exclusive use of the various "Zeiss" names and marks in the
United States. Plaintiff Carl Zeiss Foundation claimed direct ownership of
the marks, while the East German defendant claimed under an alleged
license from the purported "Zeiss Foundation" in Jena. Defendants also
asserted, in the alternative, a right to the concurrent use of the "Zeiss"
names and marks. Defendants named Carl Zeiss, Inc., the New York
subsidiary of plaintiff Carl Zeiss, as an additional defendant on the counter-
claims.
4The latter two defendants did not actively participate in the case, but stood by, having
agreed to be bound by any injunctive relief entered against the East German firm and its
distributors.
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Unlike the usual trademark case it was conceded that the names and
marks used by the respective parties were identical or confusingly similar,
and were being used in the United States in connection with the sale of
competing goods. Thus, the question of likelihood of confusion normally
presented in trademark infringement and unfair competition cases was not
presented. Rather, the question was one of identity, or status-i.e., whether
plaintiff Carl Zeiss Foundation was identical with the original foundation
created by Professor Abbe, or whether the entity calling itself the Carl
Zeiss Foundation in Jena was the true Abbe Foundation.
Extensive discovery by both sides ensued, and continued throughout the
period 1963 to 1967. Document inspection took place in Stuttgart, West
Germany, as weil as Jena, East Germany, and depositions were taken in
Stuttgart and Frankfurt, and Vienna, Austria. At the eleventh hour, not
long before the case went to trial, the entity in East Germany, claiming to
be the Carl Zeiss Foundation, sought to intervene as a party defendant, but
intervention was denied.
The case finally went to trial in November 1967. Two separate
trials-one involving the trademark claims and counterclaims and the other
involving the defense of antitrust misuse were held, occupying over six
weeks. At the first trial, Judge Walter H. Mansfield, Jr., sitting without a
jury, heard the testimony of twenty witnesses, including six experts on
German law. Also received in evidence were over 550 exhibits and exten-
sive depositions testimony.
At the second trial, involving the defense of antitrust misuse, the bulk of
the evidence consisted of the testimony of seven witnesses and excerpts
from depositions. It took Judge Mansfield almost a year to hand down his
154-page opinion, supplemented by 481 findings of fact, in November
1968. The antitrust defense issues were tried in February 1969, and de-
cided in March of that year.
The District Court, in an opinion filed on November 7, 1968, deter-
mined the questions of identity or status in favor of plaintiff Carl Zeiss
Foundation, and declared plaintiffs to be the owners of, and entitled to the
exclusive right to use, the world-renowned "Zeiss" and "Zeiss Ikon"
trademarks in the United States. It declared that defendant VEB Carl
Zeiss Jena of East Germany and its American distributors had, since 1953,
infringed these trademarks and competed unfairly with plaintiffs. It per-
maiently enjoined the defendants from using the Zeiss names and marks in
the United States, and declared that plaintiffs were entitled to damages and
accounting and costs. 5 In a subsequent opinion, filed on March 12, 1969,
the District Court dismissed the defense of antitrust misuse. 6
5160 USPQ 97.
6298 F. Supp. 1309.
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In determining that plaintiff was the true Carl Zeiss Foundation, the
District Court applied the well-settled American public policy against
giving effect to foreign expropriation decrees, with respect to property
rights in the United States. Under the principle of collateral estoppel, the
District Court also held that the defendants were bound by the determina-
tion of the Supreme Court of West Germany, in a litigation in which they
actively participated, that the Zeiss firm in Heidenheim was identical with
the Carl Zeiss firm formerly in Jena, and that the Western Zeiss manage-
ment had not resigned prior to leaving Jena, but continued to have the
exclusive capacity to act for the Zeiss firm.
The District Court also found that plaintiff Zeiss Ikon AG was the same
Zeiss Ikon which had formerly been domiciled in Dresden, and that the
expropriation of its assets had left its corporate existence in effect in West
Germany and elsewhere, where it had assets and continued to do business.
The District Court made short shrift of defendants' claims of laches,
acquiescence and abandonment. It found that plaintiffs' failure to institute
suit in the United States prior to February 1962 was justified by, inter alia,
the United States Attorney General's claim of ownership of the United
States marks, and his enforcement of the claim against the defendants. The
Court also found that defendants were, at all times, fully on notice as to
plaintiffs' claims and were never given any assurances, expressed or im-
plied, that such claims would not be pressed.
In dismissing the antitrust misuse defense as unproven, the District
Court found that no evidence had been adduced to show that the Zeiss
marks had been used at any time by plaintiffs to violate the antitrust laws,
or that plaintiffs Carl Zeiss or Zeiss Ikon were responsible for the acts of
Carl Zeiss, Inc. in the United States, which were alleged to have con-
stituted antitrust violations.
Finally, the District Court held as to defendants' counterclaims, that the
East German defendants could not assert any claims to the disputed Zeiss
marks by reason of the Trading With the Enemy Act, and regulations
under the Act, which require the United States Attorney General's approv-
al for the exercise of rights by East Germans in pre-1946 United States
trademarks.
In holding for plaintiffs, the Court gave effect to the long-standing rule,
pursuant to which courts of the United States deny extra-territorial effect
to expropriations of private property, and award property in the United
States to the surviving private victim of the expropriation who has found
refuge outside the expropriating state.
The District Court noted at the outset that "well settled" United States
policy prevents extra-territorial recognition of foreign expropriation de-
crees. Quoting from the Second Circuit's opinion in Republic of Iraq v.
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 2
246 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965), the District Court
said:
Extra-territorial enforcement of the Iraqi ordinance as to property within
the United States at the date of its promulgation turns on whether the decree
is consistent with our policy and laws. [footnote omitted]. We perceive no
basis for thinking it to be. Confiscation of the assets of a corporation has been
said to be "contrary to our public policy and shocking to our sense ofjustice." Vladikavkazsky Ry. Co. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369,
378, 189 N.E. 456, 460, 91 A.L.R. 1426 (1934).
In that case, Judge Friendly went on to note that
The policy of the United States is that there is no such thing as a "good"
confiscation by legislative or executive decree.
The District Court ruled that for purposes of this anti-expropriation
policy, United States trademarks are deemed to have their situs in the
United States, even though the trademarked goods may be manufactured
elsewhere.
The District Court also pointed out that in denying effect to foreign
expropriation decrees, American courts will "overlook technical niceties in
favor of doing substantial justice on the basis of the equities." It said:
The fashioning of such a doctrine of equitable ownership as a counterpart
of our anti-expropriation policy is frequently dictated by necessity, since
expropriation usually changes the expropriated enterprise, sometimes so dras-
tically that recognition of the survivors or their successors becomes difficult.
The District Court went on to note that while the legal identity of a
foreign corporate entity is normally to be determined by reference to the
laws of the country where it has been created "and continues to exist"
[emphasis added], in expropriation situations:
Procedural technicalities, lack of clarity in the foreign law involved, or doubt
as to its applicability ... should rarely be viewed as insurmountable ob-
stacles, particularly where United States property is at stake, since failure to
resolve the issue would reward the oppressor, give effect to fundamentally
unfair acts, or result in the property becoming "ownerless."
Applying these principles, the District Court held that "fundamental
fairness and equity" dictated recognition of the plaintiff Foundation, as the
good faith continuation in the West of what remained of the Foundation's
enterprises, after expropriation of its assets in the East.
On the other hand, the Court found as to the rival claims of defendants
that:
The "Foundation" established in 1951 in East Germany, in contrast, is but a
sham and subterfuge, erected solely for the purpose of litigation outside of
East Germany, and neither a continuation of the original organization nor a
good faith effort to resurrect it in substance or adhere to its basic tenets.
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In finding that the expropriations terminated the existence of the Foun-
dation as a viable entity in the East, the District Court found support in the
Foundation's Statute:
Section 37 ... prohibits alienation by sale or assignment of the enterprises,
either in whole or in part, and Section 116 ... provides for dissolution of the
Foundation if it should no longer possess any enterprises "whose continued
conduct would not constitute mere administration of property.
Accordingly, on the basis of all the evidence, the District Court deter-
mined that
... the Soviet expropriation sounded the death knell of the Foundation's
capacity to operate in the Soviet Zone. Conceived and operated since 1889 as
a private entity, to be free from state control, and dependent upon profits
from its commercial enterprises, it now had no such enterprises in the Soviet
Zone, no profits, no surplus, and no right to engage in operation of com-
mercial ventures for profit, by reason of the acts of a communized state that
decried such an entity as bourgeois capitalism which must be wiped out in
favor of enterprises owned by the people rather than by a foundation. Thus
expropriation, with peoples ownership and state operation of the Zeiss and
Schott works, rendered the Statute incapable of functioning in the Soviet
Zone and terminated the Foundation's existence as a viable operating entity
in the East. Without any commercial assets or operations in the East, or its
capacity to function there in the management of its commercial assets, it
became a nonentity there.
The Court's findings in this respect were in accord with the decision of
the Federal Supreme Court of Germany, rendered on November 15, 1960,
in an action brought by the Jena "Foundation" against the Zeiss firm in
Heidenheim. In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Stutt-
gart, declaring that the Foundation had become inoperative in the Soviet
Zone, the Federal Supreme Court stated:
But in any case, the taking away of the industrial Foundation enterprises
and their conversion into State directed enterprises of the nationalised econo-
my of the Soviet Occupation Zone interfered with the organization of the
Foundation as determined by the Articles to such a far reaching extent that in
the Soviet Occupation Zone, to whose territory such interference is limited
by the territorial principle, the conditions on which according to the Articles
the Foundation's capacity to act as a juristic person [depends] are no longer
satisfied.
The Supreme Court of Germany also held that the expropriation had
eliminated the Foundation's organs as well as its industrial enterprises and
that, therefore, in the Soviet Zone there were no longer any governing
bodies of the Foundation capable of functioning.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in its opinion
filed November 2, 1970, agreed with these factual conclusions:
In our opinion there is substantial credible evidence to support all of the
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findings of fact set forth above. Accordingly we agree with the district court
that if the issue of legal identity or successorship may be resolved solely as a
question of fact, the facts dictate a decision in favor of appellee "as the true
Zeiss Foundation"; and if fundamental fairness and equity are the criteria,
"the de facto existence and operation of the (appellee) Foundation in the
West as a good faith effort to continue what remained of the overall Abbe
Foundation enterprise, after expropriation of its assets in the East and its
inability to function in its original domicile, would call for its recognition." p.
897. The authorities cited by the district court support these conclusions. 433
F.2d 698.
The District Court went on to find that as a matter of German law, as
well as fact, the plaintiff Carl Zeiss Foundation was legally identical with
the Foundation of that name created by Professor Abbe. While the District
Court agreed that ordinarily an issue of identity of a corporation must be
determined by the laws of the country where it had been created, this was
rendered difficult by reason of the partition of Germany and the subsequent
expropriations in East Germany.
While the District Court went out of its way to consider the East
German decisions favoring the East German defendant, it found them to be
of little assistance and rested its conclusions on the basis of West German
law, i.e., the Wuerttemberg Ministerial Decrees and the West German Act
of Parliament validating these Decrees. It not only found that these De-
crees and the West German law were acts of state which were not subject
to judicial review but that, in any event, they would be given effect as a
matter of comity.
Again, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the
conclusions reached by Judge Mansfield:
The parties agree that the issue of identity must be determined by German
law. They disagree as to whether the German law is that promulgated and
interpreted by West Germany or by East Germany.
It is true, as Judge Mansfield stated, that the "legal existence, status,
identity, and domicile of a foreign corporate entity or juristic personality,
such as the Foundation here, must be determined by the laws of the country
where it has been created and continues to exist." p. 898. Here we have a
unique situation by reason of the partition of Germany after the creation of
the Foundation pursuant to German law and the subsequent expropriation in
East Germany. The original Foundation owned the commercial enterprises.
This was permissible under German law. Those enterprises in East Germany
are now held by VEB, a state or people-owned entity. The present Founda-
tion in East Germany claiming ownership of the Zeiss name and marks does
not claim ownership of the commercial enterprises and is dependent upon the
state owned enterprise for its support.
The district court properly held that whether German law as declared or
construed by the courts of unrecognized East Germany or recognized West
Germany [footnote omitted] should be applied depends to some extent on the
nature of the question to be resolved; that normally "the acts of an unrecog-
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nized regime which pertain to its purely local, private, and domestic affairs
will be given effect"; but that here the court is 'dealing with decisions of East
German courts with respect to matters extending beyond the borders of East
Germany, such as the nature of a Foundation under federal law and the effect
to be given to acts of Wuerttemberg." 7
We conclude that the district court properly applied the law of West
Germany .... 8
The district court made a careful and detailed analysis of the 'act of state'
doctrine, reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 84 S.Ct. 923. 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964). pp. 909-914.
We adopt that portion of Judge Mansfield's opinion and agree with his
conclusion that 'although the Wuerttemberg decrees and the German Parlia-
ment's Act of 1967 are not entitled to recognition as acts of state to the
extent that they purport to terminate the Foundation's domicile in East
Germany since to that extent they acted extra-territorially, they are entitled
to such recognition insofar as they acted to give a legal status to the Founda-
tion's de facto existence in West Germany as a continuation in the West of
the original Zeiss cooperative enterprise, whose remaining commercial assets
(worth 30 million marks) and personnel were almost entirely within the
West's territorial jurisdiction." 9
Likewise, the Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's determina-
tion that plaintiff Zeiss Ikon was identical with the corporation of that
name, which had previously been domiciled in Dresden; it adopted Judge
Mansfield's opinion holding that the defendants were barred from asserting
any claims in the United States Zeiss trademarks, by reason of the Trading
With the Enemy Act; it agreed with the District Court's rejection of the
claim for joint or concurrent use, as well as the defenses of laches, acquies-
cence and abandonment, and also with the dismissal of the antitrust misuse
defense.
The only point on which the Court of Appeals parted company with
Judge Mansfield was the issue of damages. While Judge Mansfield had held
that plaintiffs were entitled to damages and an accounting, the Court of
Appeals held that since the East German defendant and its American
distributors were not guilty of fraud or palming off in that they had not
represented that their goods originated in Heidenheim, nor had they
claimed that they were licensees of the West German Foundation. There-
fore, the Court of Appeals determined that an injunction would satisfy the
equities of the case and disallowed the claim for damages.' 0
In their petition for certiorari filed in April 197 1, defendants argued that
the Court of Appeals' affirmance of the District Court's refusal to apply
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East German law was error. They likewise argued that the Court of
Appeals should independently have researched the German law questions
involved in the case.
This argument was based on Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure which, defendants argued, mandated an independent in-
vestigation of German materials and sources by the Appellate Court. Rule
44.1, of course, governs procedure in the District Courts and not in the
Courts of Appeal. Moreover, it does not mandate anything, but only
permits a district court to treat issues of foreign law as questions of law
rather than fact.
The petition for certiorari also argued that the courts below had mis-
interpreted Section 33(b)(7) of the Lanham Act, in holding that this Section
was available only to refute the evidentiary effect of a trademark registra-
tion, but provides no substantive defense to trademark infringement.
Finally, the defendants contended in their petition to the Supreme Court,
that refusal by the courts below to permit joint use violated "long honored
trademark principles."
On June 7, 1971, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, ending nine and a
half years of sometimes bitterly-fought litigation. This victory, after a
long-fought court battle, came as somewhat of an anticlimax. Actually, in
April, two months earlier, the East and West Zeiss groups had entered into
a worldwide settlement calling, among other things, for termination of
litigation in all countries in which cases were pending.
It can fairly be stated that the Zeiss litigation was, for the most part,
unique, and called for the application of reasonably well-known legal prin-
ciples to facts which will, in all likelihood, never be repeated. The holdings
of the District Court and Court of Appeals on questions of the governing
law, the "act of state" doctrine, laches and acquiescence, were hardly
precedent- shattering.
The only truly novel legal questions presented were those relating to the
Trading With the Enemy Act, and its impact on East German claims to
pre-War trademarks in the United States, and the interpretation to be given
the antitrust misuse defense established by Section 33(b)(7) of the Lanham
Act. Both these issues were subsidiary to the main questions of identity
and legal capacity, which turned primarily on the facts.
Despite defendants' contentions that the District Court and the Court of
Appeals were influenced by "Cold War predilections and attitudes," it
cannot fairly be argued that the decision in the Zeiss case was primarily
influenced by political considerations, except insofar as the legal doctrine
pursuant to which our courts refuse to give effect to foreign expropriation
decrees, insofar as they affect United States property could be said to be
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politically inspired. The facts were more fully exposed in this case than in
any other case between the contending parties.
American federal procedure, including liberal rules of discovery, gave
the parties a unique opportunity to sift through opposing parties' files and
interrogate opposing parties' officers and employees-an opportunity which
had not been available in any of the litigation pending in other parts of the
world. It was, thus, perhaps fitting that the American case, in which the
facts had been probed to, the fullest extent, marked the final round in the
17-year worldwide court battle between East and West.
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